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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSPIRACY-ACTIONABLE WRONG, IN MALICIOUSLY INTER-
FERING WITH BROKER'S RIGHT TO EARN COMMISSION.-The Dry
Dock Savings Institution, the owner of certain real property, em-
ployed plaintiff to sell the property and agreed to pay plaintiff the
usual brokerage commission. For several months the plaintiff negoti-
ated between the defendant, Lorber, and the bank, and induced the
bank and Lorber to be satisfied with a price of $480,000, $50,000
cash and a five-year mortgage of three and one-half per cent and a
one per cent amortization. In August, 1938, after defendant, Lorber,
had told plaintiff he was satisfied with the terms he informed plaintiff
that he would not close the deal unless plaintiff would give him $7,200
of the $8,200 commission which plaintiff would earn.' Plaintiff
refused and informed the bank of the stand he had taken concerning
the proposition for the splitting of the brokerage commission by
Lorber. Subsequently the bank employed Geller Realty Associates,
a dummy broker, who arranged to give Lorber all of the commissions
to be earned except $1,200. The sale was consummated on sub-
stantially the same terms as plaintiff had arranged and Geller Realty
Associates endorsed the commission check from the bank over to
Lorber who then paid Geller Realty Associates $1,200. Plaintiff
did not claim that he ever did procure a purchaser. He did not sue
for commissions as, such. Plaintiff alleged that, through a conspiracy
which was illegal and fraudulent, he was prevented from procuring
a purchaser, and that if the scheme had not been put into operation
plaintiff could have procured the purchaser and would have earned
his commission. Held, judgment for plaintiff affirmed. The damage
suffered by plaintiff was the loss of an asset in his business and the
acquisition by defendant, Lorber, of that asset. When defendants
conspired to refrain from dealing with plaintiff and thus, although
accepting the fruits of his labors, prevented him from earning his
commission, an actionable wrong arose, giving rise to liability for
the damages resulting therefrom to plaintiff which consisted of the
amount of the commissions which plaintiff would otherwise have
earned. It constituted an unjustifiable interference with the right
of plaintiff to pursue his lawful occupation and to receive the earn-
ings of his industry and the fruits of his labors. Kevicsky v. Lorber,
290 N. Y. 297, 49 N. E. (2d) 146 (1943).
No branch of the law has been less clear than that of conspiracy.
At common law there was an action on the case in the nature of
conspiracy for the damage caused to plaintiff.2 The law of con-
3 The amendment of Section 442 of the New York Real Property Law,
prohibiting splitting of commissions by a broker with a purchaser did not
become law until April 25, 1941 (N. Y. Laws 1941, c. 719).
2 Sorrel v. Smith, [1925] A. C. 700.
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spiracy pertaining to brokerage commissions has gradually been ex-
tended by the courts of the State of New York. In 1929 the Second
Department of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court held
that the interference of a third party in preventing an employer from
paying earned commissions to a broker was not an actionable wrong
incurring liability to the alleged tortfeasor. Only the contractor was
held liable for the amount due on the contract.3 This type of inter-
ference with partial execution of the contract was held not sufficient
to support a tort action. This decision was directly at variance with
the determination of the First Department in 1928 to the effect that
one who, with knowledge of an existing valid contract between
others, intentionally, knowingly, and without reasonable justification
or excuse, induces breach to the damage of one of the other parties,
is liable for damages sustained.4 In 1930 the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the First Department thereby disapproving of the
adverse holding of the Second Department. In Union Car Advertis-
ing Company v. Collier5 the court were of the opinion that the
plaintiff failed to maintain the burden of proof to show that defendant
used such means to procure the contract as would support an action.
In Clinchy v. Grandview Dairy, Inc.,6 it was held that an insurance
company is obliged to obey the instructions of the insured as to the
selection of the broker and that, under these circumstances, the insur-
ance company is without liability to the broker.
As early as 1926 the courts of Connecticut allowed damages to
be recovered by plaintiff broker. 7 In 1934 the State of New Jersey
held that a conspiracy to deprive a broker of earned commissions
constituted an actionable wrong." The federal courts have also indi-
cated that damage may be recovered under like circumstances. 9 An
3 Weinberg v. Irwinessie Holding Corp., 225 App. Div. 241, 232 N. Y.
Supp. 443 (1929).4 Hornstein v. Podwitz, 224 App. Div. 11, 229 N. Y. Supp. 159 (1928),
aff'd, 254 N. Y. 443, 173 N. E. 674 (1930). Defendant, third party, induced
plaintiff's contractor to breach contract.
G Union Car Advertising Co. v. Collier, 263 N. Y. 386, 189 N. E. 463
(1934). Defendant induced third party to enter into contract with defendant
even though plaintiff's bid was lower than that of defendant.
6 Clinchy v. Grandview Dairy, Inc., 283 N. Y. 39, 27 N. E. (2d) 425
(1940). After binders were issued, the defendant, Grandview Dairy, Inc., for
political reasons, instructed the defendant insurance company that the insurance
contract would be entered into only with a broker other than the plaintiff.
7 Skene v. Carayanis, 103 Conn. 708, 131 Atl. 497 (1926). Broker obtained
purchaser for certain real property at $90,000. Purchaser subsequently made a
deal through another broker for $85,000. Plaintiff was allowed to recover
damages, not commissions.
s Kamm v. Flink, 113 N. J. L. 582, 175 Atl. 62 (1934). Defendant, Julius
Flink, president of Building and Loan Association, induced plaintiff, broker, to
reveal the name of his customer. Defendant then gave the name of plaintiff's
client to his brother, Carl Flink, who acted as a broker. Case was dismissed
by the trial court as insufficient at law but was reversed by the higher court on
the law and remanded for trial.
9 Lewis v. Bloede, 202 Fed. 7 (1912).
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early Michigan case held that where the defendant maliciously and
without good cause persuaded a potential buyer to reject the machine
of the plaintiff, inventor, the defendant was liable for damages sus-
tained.' 0 In the principal case the Court of Appeals affirmed the
determination reached in Hornstein v. Podwitz,11 to the effect that
all parties wrongfully inducing a breach of contract to pay a broker
commissions are jointly and severally liable. However, the court
by basing the decision on the conspiracy to prevent the plaintiff from
earning commissions rather than upon the theory of interference with
the payment of commissions already accrued, extended the law to
include cases wherein the contractual relationship has not yet matured.
J. L. S.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS-
DISTRIBUTION OF LITERATuRE.-The appellant, espiousing the creed
of Jehovah's Witnesses, knocked on doors and rang doorbells in the
defendant city for the purpose of distributing leaflets advertising a
religious meeting. For delivering a leaflet, she was convicted in the
Mayor's Court and fined on a charge of violating a city ordinance.'
On appeal from conviction, appellant claimed the ordinance was in
violation of the right of freedom of press and religion under the
Federal Constitution.2 The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the
convictions whereupon appellant appealed to the United States
Supreme Court. Held, reversed. The ordinance is unconstitutional
because it abridges the freedom of speech and press as guaranteed
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Con-
stitution.4 Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio, 317 U. S. 589, 63
Sup. Ct. 42, 87 L. ed. 22 (1943).
10 Morgan v. Andrews, 107 Mich. 33, 64 N. W. 869 (1895).
"1224 App. Div. 11, 229 N. Y. Supp. 159 (1928), aff'd, 254 N. Y. 443,
173 N. E. 674 (1930).
I The ordinance reads as follows: "It is unlawful for any person distrib-
uting handbills, circulars or other advertisements, to ring the doorbell, sound
the door knocker, or otherwise summon the inmate or inmates of any residence
to the door for the purpose of receiving such handbills, circulars or other adver-
tisements they or any other person with them may be distributing."
2 U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech or of the press."
U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV. Second sentence reads, in'part: "... No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States . . .!
3 139 Ohio St. 372, 40 N. E. (2d) 154.
4 See note 2 mtpra.
But see dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Reed: "No ideas are being sup-
pressed. No censorship is involved. The freedom to teach or preach by word
or book is unabridged, save only the right to call a householder to the door of
his house to receive the summoner's message. I cannot expand this regulation
to a violation of the First Amendment." Martin v. Struthers, 317 U. S. 589,
63 Sup. Ct. 42, 87 L. ed. 22 (1943).
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